Toussaint chiama i cittadini europei alla mobilitazione

Eric Toussaint chiama i cittadini europei alla mobilitazione popolare.

N. B. In questo testo ci sono tre documenti, uno in italiano, un altro in lingua inglese e il terzo, il più importante, in lingua francese, alla fine di questo post.

di Sergio Di Cori Modigliani

Da Yannis Varoufakis a Giulio Sapelli, insorge il continente.

La Gran Bretagna è sgomenta nel leggere l’intervista a Varoufakis, in esclusiva, apparsa ieri mattina, sulla testata considerata il tempio del pensiero progressista europeo.

Il filosofo belga Eric Toussaint chiama i cittadini europei alla mobilitazione popolare contro la Germania. In fondo, trovate il testo integrale dell’opposizione in Grecia contro l’accordo Tsipras-Troika. E’ l’autentica voce progressista europea sulla questione greca.

“Ce n’est qu’n debut, continuons le combat!”

E’ proprio il caso di dirlo. Una frase, questa, che ai cittadini europei di età inferiore ai 50 anni non dice assolutamente nulla. E’ in francese, e vuol dire “non è che l’inizio, continuiamo a combattere” ed è stato lo slogan totemico che esplose nel maggio del 1968, a Parigi, dando inizio alla rivolta europea contro il colonialismo, contro l’imperialismo americano e contro il totalitarismo sovietico. 47 anni fa.

Il resto è Storia.

Chi ritiene che la questione greca sia chiusa ed è finita così, si sbaglia di grosso. La Germania ottiene una vittoria di Pirro, Alexis Tsipras ottiene una sconfitta personale ma la Grecia ha ormai infiammato la coscienza e la consapevolezza internazionale, suscitando discussioni, liti, passioni. Sono giornate convulse, complesse, come accade sempre nei momenti di intenso e grande cambiamento.

Ripropongo qui di seguito l’opinione del prof. Giulio Sapelli, eccellente economista e intellettuale italiano, in una intervista che ieri ha rilasciato a un giornalista de Il Fatto Quotidiano.

Subito dopo, una intervista a Varoufakis pubblicata in esclusiva sulla testata storica britannica “The New Statesman”, nata nel 1913, fondata dal commediografo umorista George Bernard Shaw, per conto della “Fabian society”, da sempre considerata il tempio del pensiero progressista europeo e punto di riferimento dell’antagonismo storico britannico. Nel corso dell’intervista (non a caso Varoufakis ha scelto questa testata) parlando con Harry Lambert, l’ex premier ellenico spiega e argomenta la propria posizione in maniera molto specifica, chiarendo come stanno andando le cose.

C’era un accordo (prima del referendum) basato sul fatto di opporre una strenua resistenza -se avesse vinto il no- che comportava l’immediata accensione in Grecia di una moneta complementare parallela, l’apertura di un negoziato sulla ristrutturazione del debito e, nel caso i tedeschi non avessero accettato, accelerare verso la denuncia del debito immorale. Sempre secondo Varoufakis, la Germania, fin dall’inizio, ha fatto capire che intendeva buttare fuori la Grecia dall’euro e dall’Europa perché non avrebbe mai accettato l’idea che una nazione dell’euro potesse essere governata da un governo non incline ad accettare le disposizioni economiche, finanziarie e politiche di Berlino, e sempre secondo lui, seguita a essere l’opzione che la Germania sta perseguendo, sapendo che da domani si apre una situazione di conflittualità esplosiva in Grecia che, molto probabilmente porterà alla fine di Syriza.

Varoufakis spiega come Alexis Tsipras ha ceduto alle 3.40 del mattino, dopo sedici ore di”tortura”. Il cedimento è umanamente comprensibile ma politicamente inaccettabile. Varoufakis fa capire che la squadra messa in piedi va avanti e intende dar battaglia, a questo punto, anche contro Alexis Tsipras. Questa intervista, insieme agli editoriali di fuoco apparsi su “The Guardian” (“Alexis Tsipras ha subito un’autentica tortura da parte dei tedeschi come avviene a Guantanamo”) all’apertura della BBC (“I tedeschi impongono la loro ferrea volontà al resto d’Europa: è un monito severo per far arrivare un chiaro messaggio a Francia, Italia e Spagna”) hanno scosso molto l’opinione pubblica britannica.

Infine, una lettera inviata dal filosofo ed economista belga Eric Toussaint ad Angelo Consoli (riferimento in Europa delle politiche economiche di Jeremy Rifkin) con la specifica richiesta di impegnarsi a diffonderla in tutta Europa, spiegando che adesso, più che mai, la Grecia ha bisogno di una mobilitazione di massa internazionale per sostenere il suo diritto legittimo a salvaguardare la propria sovranità contro l’eccessiva ingerenza tedesca. In questa lunga lettera sono esposte le modalità che la squadra composta da diverse persone e capitanata da Yannis Varoufakis, Eric Toussaint e John Galbraith, hanno elaborato come manovra alternativa da opporre alla inaccettabile soluzione Tsipras.

Sia il testo inglese che quello francese sono in lingua originale.

Buona lettura:

1). L’intervista a Giulio Sapelli.

http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2015/07/13/grecia-sapelli-germania-vuole-uccidere-la-grecia-mossa-da-fanatismo-ideologico/1868744/

Giulio Sapelli, economista e docente di Storia economica all’università Statale di Milano. Cosa guadagna la Germania da una eventuale Grexit?

“La Germania vuole ammazzare la Grecia. Se si fosse riunito il Consiglio Ue a 28 – cosa che non si è fatta sotto la pressione diplomatica francese e americana – e si fosse arrivati al voto, la Germania e i suoi vassalli l’avrebbero espulsa. Poi è arrivata la decisione di non riunione il Consiglio europeo, ma di convocare l’Eurosummit composto dai Paesi che hanno l’euro”.

Che ha chiesto ad Atene un fondo da 50 miliardi in cui far confluire gli asset greci in cambio del terzo salvataggio.

“Si è compiuto ciò che era già scritto. Sono dei fanatici che fanno dell’austerità una religione: all’austerità può credere soltanto unprofessore della Bocconi, uno che non è un economista ma è un ragioniere. Dietro questa battuta c’è una tragedia immensa: la riduzione dell’economia alla ragioneria“.

In alternativa, è rimasta sul tavolo fino all’ultimo la possibilità di una Grexit temporanea di 5 anni.

“E’ matto, non ha un senso economico. Ha solo un senso politico, di affermazione, di dominio: i tedeschi vogliono di nuovo dominare l’Europa.Helmut Schmidt diceva :’Devi abbracciarel’Europa, non sedertici sopra‘. Loro ci si siedono sopra. La questione greca – e in questi giorni si celebra l’anniversario della strage di Srebrenica – comincia dalla Bosnia, passa dalla Macedonia, va in Grecia, poi finisce a Mosca o in Turchia. Ci sono buone ragioni per pensare che i tedeschi spalancheranno le porte alla vittoria dell’Isis”.

E’ un’affermazione forte, professore.

“Questa è la vera chiave di questa tragedia. Destabilizzando la Grecia, destabilizzano i Balcani. E in Bosnia, in Kosovo in Macedonia e in Montenegro c’è l’Isis, sono Paesi in cui è evidente e diffuso il fenomeno della radicalizzazione “.

Cosa succede oggi in Grecia senza un accordo?

“Le banche resteranno chiuse e spero che tra un po’ di tempo verranno fuori le monete complementari, di cui la Bce aveva preconizzato l’uso. I greci andranno avanti per un po’ con le monete complementari, poi torneranno alla dracma ma sarà una catastrofe perché dovranno pagare i loro debiti in euro e soprattutto le banche francesi e quelle tedesche sono piene di debito greco collateralizzato, un’arma di distruzione di massa”.

Ma perché la Germania avrebbero architettato questo piano diabolico?

“I tedeschi fanno questo non per calcolo economico, ma solo perfanatismo ideologico. Sono dei fanatici. Questa situazione riflette la disgregazione dell’ordine internazionale
. Tutte le medie potenze regionali aspirano ad operare “stand alone“, da sole: i tedeschi sono convinti di poter andare avanti senza gli Stati Unitie si alleano con i cinesi, gli inglesi anche, i russi hanno scelto da tempo la via dell’isolazionismo, i francesi sono gli unici che hanno ambizioni imperiali e ciò è dimostrato dal fatto che hanno cercato di aiutare i greci. Noi abbiamo perso una grande occasione e credo che Renzi rischi moltissimo”:

Cosa rischia Renzi?

“Questa roba delle intercettazioni è stato un avviso degli americani, che gli hanno detto ‘guarda che se non ti comporti bene, non fai come Hollande e non ti metti chiaramente con Atene, noi ti facciamo cadere’. Ma il nostro presidente non intercetta i messaggi che arrivano da oltreoceano, quindi sceglie di essere fedeleassolutismo teutonico. Questa è una disgrazia, perché l’Europa senza l’appoggio degli Stati Uniti non esiste, è un nano. Anche economico, nella stagnazione secolare che avanza. Avevo previsto questa tendenza al predominio dei tedeschi. E’ una cosa che inizia con la vittoria di Sedan, dal 1870 (battaglia decisiva della prima fase della guerra franco-prussiana, che portò alla capitolazione di Napoloeone III e alla fine della secondo Impero francese, ndr). I tedeschi adesso danno l’ultima mazzata alla Francia. Ma è anche una grande sconfitta della Merkel: se avesse aiutato Atene, non sarebbe più stata Cancelliere”.

Quindi Renzi crede ancora di potere esercitare un ruolo in Europa?

“Renzi non crede in nulla. Se lo credesse, avrebbe dovuto chiedere una conferenza internazionale con Stati Uniti e Cina sul debito greco”.

Forse lei conferisce a Renzi un peso internazionale che non ha.

“Il peso internazionale lo si acquisisce sfidando il cielo. Potrebbe cominciare a farlo: insomma, l’Italia ha 60 milioni di abitanti, è in una posizione di assoluta centralità al centro del Mediterraneo. Avrebbe le carte in regola per osare e chiedere di più. E’ solo un fatto di coraggio. Renzi questo coraggio non ce l’ha, quindi segna la fine della Grecia, del ruolo internazionale dell’Italia e forse anche del suo governo”.

Alla fine vincerà la Germania, quindi.

“Ha già vinto. Ma vincerà, perdendo: Merkel porta a casa una vittoria di Pirro perché sarà costretta a fare un blocco economico del Nord. All’inizio si darà vita a un euro a due velocità. E questo segnerà la fine dell’Europa unita”.

_

2). L’intervista di Yannis Varoufakis rilasciata a Harry Lambert, in esclusiva per “The New Statesman”. http://www.newstatesman.com/world-affairs/2015/07/yanis-varoufakis-full-transcript-our-battle-save-greece

Harry Lambert: So how are you feeling?

Yanis Varoufakis: I’m feeling on top of the world – I no longer have to live through this hectic timetable, which was absolutely inhuman, just unbelievable. I was on 2 hours sleep every day for five months. … I’m also relieved I don’t have to sustain any longer this incredible pressure to negotiate for a position I find difficult to defend, even if I managed to force the other side to acquiesce, if you know what I mean.

HL: What was it like? Did you like any aspect of it?

YV: Oh well a lot of it. But the inside information one gets… to have your worst fears confirmed … To have “the powers that be” speak to you directly, and it be as you feared – the situation was worse than you imagined! So that was fun, to have the front row seat.

HL: What are you referring to?

YV: The complete lack of any democratic scruples, on behalf of the supposed defenders of Europe’s democracy. The quite clear understanding on the other side that we are on the same page analytically – of course it will never come out at present. [And yet] To have very powerful figures look at you in the eye and say “You’re right in what you’re saying, but we’re going to crunch you anyway.”

HL: You’ve said creditors objected to you because “I try and talk economics in the Eurogroup, which nobody does.” What happened when you did?

YV: It’s not that it didn’t go down well – it’s that there was point blank refusal to engage in economic arguments. Point blank. … You put forward an argument that you’ve really worked on – to make sure it’s logically coherent – and you’re just faced with blank stares. It is as if you haven’t spoken. What you say is independent of what they say. You might as well have sung the Swedish national anthem – you’d have got the same reply. And that’s startling, for somebody who’s used to academic debate. … The other side always engages. Well there was no engagement at all. It was not even annoyance, it was as if one had not spoken.

HL: When you first arrived, in early February, this can’t have been a unified position?

YV: Well there were people who were sympathetic at a personal level – so, you know, behind closed doors, on an informal basis, especially from the IMF. [HL] But then inside the Eurogroup, a few kind words and that’s it, back behind the parapet of the official version.

[But] Schäuble was consistent throughout. His view was “I’m not discussing the programme – this was accepted by the previous government and we can’t possibly allow an election to change anything. Because we have elections all the time, there are 19 of us, if every time there was an election and something changed, the contracts between us wouldn’t mean anything.”

So at that point I had to get up and say “Well perhaps we should simply not hold elections anymore for indebted countries”, and there was no answer. The only interpretation I can give [of their view] is “Yes, that would be a good idea, but it would be difficult to do. So you either sign on the dotted line or you are out.”

HL: And Merkel?

YV: You have to understand I never had anything to do with Merkel, finance ministers talk to finance ministers, prime ministers talk to Chancellors. From my understanding, she was very different. She tried to placate the Prime Minister [Tsipras] – she said “We’ll find a solution, don’t worry about it, I won’t let anything awful happen, just do your homework and work with the institutions, work with the Troika; there can be no dead end here.”

This is not what I heard from my counterpart – both from the head of the Eurogroup and Dr Schäuble, they were very clear. At some point it was put to me very unequivocally: “This is a horse and either you get on it or it is dead.”

HL: Right so when was that?

YV: From the beginning, from the very beginning.

HL: So why hang around until the summer?

YV: Well one doesn’t have an alternative. Our government was elected with a mandate to negotiate. So our first mandate was to create the space and time to have a negotiation and reach another agreement. That was our mandate – our mandate was to negotiate, it was not to come to blows with our creditors. …

The negotiations took ages, because the other side was refusing to negotiate. They insisted on a “comprehensive agreement”, which meant they wanted to talk about everything. My interpretation is that when you want to talk about everything, you don’t want to talk about anything. But we went along with that.

And look there were absolutely no positions put forward on anything by them. So they would… let me give you an example. They would say we need all your data on the fiscal path on which Greek finds itself, we need all the data on state-owned enterprises. So we spent a lot of time trying to provide them with all the data and answering questionnaires and having countless meetings providing the data.

So that would be the first phase. The second phase was where they’d ask us what we intended to do on VAT. They wou
ld then reject our proposal but wouldn’t come up with a proposal of their own. And then, before we would get a chance to agree on VAT with them, they would shift to another issue, like privatisation. They would ask what we want to do about privatisation, we put something forward, they would reject it. Then they’d move onto another topic, like pensions, from there to product markets, from there to labour relations, from labour relations to all sorts of things right? So it was like a cat chasing its own tail.

We felt, the government felt, that we couldn’t discontinue the process. Look, my suggestion from the beginning was this: This is a country that has run aground, that ran aground a long time ago. … Surely we need to reform this country – we are in agreement on this. Because time is of the essence, and because during negotiations the central bank was squeezing liquidity [on Greek banks] in order pressurise us, in order to succumb, my constant proposal to the Troika was very simple: let us agree on three or four important reforms that we agree upon, like the tax system, like VAT, and let’s implement them immediately. And you relax the restrictions on liqiuidity from the ECB. You want a comprehensive agreement – let’s carry on negotiating – and in the meantime let us introduce these reforms in parliament by agreement between us and you.

And they said “No, no, no, this has to be a comprehensive review. Nothing will be implemented if you dare introduce any legislation. It will be considered unilateral action inimical to the process of reaching an agreement.” And then of course a few months later they would leak to the media that we had not reformed the country and that we were wasting time! And so… [chuckles] we were set up, in a sense, in an important sense.

So by the time the liquidity almost ran out completely, and we were in default, or quasi-default, to the IMF, they introduced their proposals, which were absolutely impossible… totally non-viable and toxic. So they delayed and then came up with the kind of proposal you present to another side when you don’t want an agreement.

HL: Did you try working together with the governments of other indebted countries?

YV: The answer is no, and the reason is very simple: from the very beginning those particular countries made it abundantly clear that they were the most energetic enemies of our government, from the very beginning. And the reason of course was their greatest nightmare was our success: were we to succeed in negotiating a better deal for Greece, that would of course obliterate them politically, they would have to answer to their own people why they didn’t negotiate like we were doing.

HL: And partnering with sympathetic parties, like Podemos?

YV: Not really. I mean we always had a good relationship with them, but there was nothing they could do – their voice could never penetrate the Eurogroup. And indeed the more they spoke out in our favour, which they did, the more inimical the Finance Minister representing that country became towards us.

HL: And George Osborne? What were your dealings like with him?

YV: Oh very good, very pleasant, excellent. But he is out of the loop, he is not part of the Eurogroup. When I spoke to him on a number of occasions you could see that was very sympathetic. And indeed if you look at the Telegraph, the greatest supporters of our cause have been the Tories! Because of their Eurosceptism, eh… it’s not just Euroscepticsm; it’s a Burkean view of the sovereignty of parliament – in our case it was very clear that our parliament was being treated like rubbish.

HL: What is the greatest problem with the general way the Eurogroup functions?

YV: [To exemplify…] There was a moment when the President of the Eurogroup decided to move against us and effectively shut us out, and made it known that Greece was essentially on its way out of the Eurozone. … There is a convention that communiqués must be unanimous, and the President can’t just convene a meeting of the Eurozone and exclude a member state. And he said, “Oh I’m sure I can do that.” So I asked for a legal opinion. It created a bit of a kerfuffle. For about 5-10 minutes the meeting stopped, clerks, officials were talking to one another, on their phone, and eventually some official, some legal expert addressed me, and said the following words, that “Well, the Eurogroup does not exist in law, there is no treaty which has convened this group.”

So what we have is a non-existent group that has the greatest power to determine the lives of Europeans. It’s not answerable to anyone, given it doesn’t exist in law; no minutes are kept; and it’s confidential. So no citizen ever knows what is said within. … These are decisions of almost life and death, and no member has to answer to anybody.

HL: And is that group controlled by German attitudes?

YV: Oh completely and utterly. Not attitudes – by the finance minister of Germany. It is all like a very well-tuned orchestra and he is the director. Everything happens in tune. There will be times when the orchestra is out of tune, but he convenes and puts it back in line.

HL: Is there no alternative power within the group, can the French counter that power?

YV: Only the French finance minister has made noises that were different from the German line, and those noises were very subtle. You could sense he had to use very judicious language, to be seen not to oppose. And in the final analysis, when Doc Schäuble responded and effectively determined the official line, the French FM in the end would always fold and accept.

HL: Let’s talk about your theoretical background, and your piece on Marx in 2013, when you said:

“A Greek or a Portuguese or an Italian exit from the Eurozone would soon lead to a fragmentation of European capitalism, yielding a seriously recessionary surplus region east of the Rhine and north of the Alps, while the rest of Europe is would be in the grip of vicious stagflation. Who do you think would benefit from this development? A progressive left, that will rise Phoenix-like from the ashes of Europe’s public institutions? Or the Golden Dawn Nazis, the assorted neofascists, the xenophobes and the spivs? I have absolutely no doubt as to which of the two will do best from a disintegration of the eurozone.”

…so would a Grexit inevitably help Golden Dawn, do you still think that?

YV: Well, look, I don’t believe in deterministic versions of history. Syriza now is a very dominant force. If we manage to get out of this mess united, and handle properly a Grexit … it would be possible to have an alternative. But I’m not sure we would manage it, because managing the collapse of a monetary unio takes a great deal of expertise, and I’m not sure we have it here in Greece without the help of outsiders.

HL: You must have been thinking about a Grexit from day one…

YV: Yes, absolutely.

HL: …have preparations been made?

YV: The answer is yes and no. We had a small group, a ‘war cabinet’ within the ministry, of about five people that were doing this: so we worked out in theory, on paper, everything that had to be done [to prepare for/in the event of a Grexit]. But it’s one thing to do that at the level of 4-5 people, it’s quite another to prepare the country for it. To prepare the country an executive decision had to be taken, and that decision was never taken.

HL: And in the past week, was that a decision you felt you were leaning towards [preparing for Grexit]?

YV: My view was, we should be very careful not to activate it. I didn’t want this to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. I didn’t want this to be like Nietzsche’s famous dictum that if you stare into the abyss long enough, the abyss will stare back at you. But I also believed that at the momen
t the Eurogroup shut out banks down, we should energise this process.

HL: Right. So there were two options as far as I can see – an immediate Grexit, or printing IOUs and taking bank control of the Bank of Greece [potentially but not necessarily precipitating a Grexit]?

YV: Sure, sure. I never believed we should go straight to a new currency. My view was – and I put this to the government – that if they dared shut our banks down, which I considered to be an aggressive move of incredible potency, we should respond aggressively but without crossing the point of no return.

We should issue our own IOUs, or even at least announce that we’re going to issue our own euro-denominated liquidity; we should haircut the Greek 2012 bonds that the ECB held, or announce we were going to do it; and we should take control of the Bank of Greece. This was the triptych, the three things, which I thought we should respond with if the ECB shut down our banks.

… I was warning the Cabinet this was going to happen

for a month, in order to drag us into a humiliating agreement. When it happened – and many of my colleagues couldn’t believe it happened – my recommendation for responding “energetically”, let’s say, was voted down.

HL: And how close was it to happening?

YV: Well let me say that out of six people we were in a minority of two. … Once it didn’t happen I got my orders to close down the banks consensually with the ECB and the Bank of Greece, which I was against, but I did because I’m a team player, I believe in collective responsibility.

And then the referendum happened, and the referendum gave us an amazing boost, one that would have justified this type of energetic response [his plan] against the ECB, but then that very night the government decided that the will of the people, this resounding ‘No’, should not be what energised the energetic approach [his plan].

Instead it should lead to major concessions to the other side: the meeting of the council of political leaders, with our Prime Minister accepting the premise that whatever happens, whatever the other side does, we will never respond in any way that challenges them. And essentially that means folding. … You cease to negotiate.

HL: So you can’t hold out much hope now, that this deal will be much better than last week’s – if anything it will be worse?

YV: If anything it will be worse. I trust and hope that our government will insist on debt restructuring, but I can’t see how the German finance minister is ever going to sign up to this in the forthcoming Eurogroup meeting. If he does, it will be a miracle.

HL: Exactly – because, as you’ve explained, your leverage is gone at this point?

YV: I think so, I think so. Unless he [Schäuble] gets his marching orders from the Chancellor. That remains to be seen, whether she will step in to do that.

HL: To come back out again, could you possibly explain, in layman’s terms for our readers, your objections to Piketty’s “Capital”?

YV: Well let me say firstly, I feel embarrassed because Piketty has been extremely supportive of me and the government, and I have been horrible to him in my review of his book! I really appreciate his position over the last few months, and I’m going to say this to him when I meet him in September.

But my criticism of his book stands. His sentiment is correct. His abhorrence of inequality… [inaudible]. His analysis, however, undermines the argument, as far as I am concerned. Because in his book the neoclassical model of capitalism gives very little room for building the case he wants to build up, except by building upon the model a very specific set of parameters, which undermines his own case. In other words, if I was an opponent of his thesis that inequality is built into capitalism, I would be able to take apart his case by attacking his analysis.

HL: I don’t want to get too detailed, because this isn’t going to make the final cut…

YV: Yes…

HL: …but it’s about his metric of wealth?

YV: Yes, he uses a definition of capital which makes capital impossible to understand – so it’s a contradiction of terms. [Click here—link to add: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2014/10/08/6006/—for Varoufakis’ critical review of Piketty’s Capital.]

HL: Let’s come back to the crisis. I really understand very little of your relationship with Tsipras…

YV: I’ve known him since late 2010, because I was a prominent critic of the government at the time, even though I was close to it once upon a time. I was close to the Papandreou family – I still am in a way – but I became prominent … back then it was big news that a former adviser was saying “We’re pretending bankruptcy didn’t happen, we’re trying to cover it up with new unsustainable loans,” that kind of thing.

I made some waves back then, and Tsipras was a very young leader trying to understand what was going on, what the crisis was about, and how he should position himself.

HL: Was there a first meeting you remember?

YV: Oh yes. It was late 2010, we went to a cafeteria, there were three of us, and my recollection is that he wasn’t clear back then what his views were, on the drachma versus the euro, on the causes of the crises, and I had very, well shall I say, “set views” on what was going on. And a dialogue begun which unfolded over the years and one that… I believe that I helped shape his view of what should be done.

HL: So how does it feel now, after four-and-a-half years, to no longer be working by his side?

YV: Well I don’t feel that way, I feel that we’re very close. Our parting was extremely amicable. We’ve never had a bad problem between us, never, not to this day. And I’m extremely close to Euclid Tsakalotos

.

HL: And presumably you’re still speaking with them both this week?

YV: I haven’t spoken to the Prime Minister this week, in the past couple of days, but I speak to Euclid, yes, and I consider Euclid to be very close to be, and vice-versa, and I don’t envy him at all. [Chuckling.]

HL: Would you be shocked if Tsipras resigned?

YV: Nothing shocks me these days – our Eurozone is a very inhospitable place for decent people. It wouldn’t shock me either to stay on and accepts a very bad deal. Because I can understand he feels he has an obligation to the people that support him, support us, not to let this country become a failed state.

But I’m not going to betray my own view, that I honed back in 2010, that this country must stop extending and pretending, we must stop taking on new loans pretending that we’ve solved the problem, when we haven’t; when we have made our debt even less sustainable on condition of further austerity that even further shrinks the economy; and shifts the burden further onto the have nots, creating a humanitarian crisis. It’s something I’m not going to accept. I’m not going to be party to.

HL: Final question – will you stay close with anyone who you had to negotiate with?

YV: Um, I’m not sure. I’m not going to mention any names now just in case I destroy their careers! [Laughing.]

_

3). Lettera aperta inviata dall’economista e filosofo belga Eric Toussaint, per diffonderla in tutta Europa. Sta già circolando in Francia da ieri notte.

Une alternative est possible au plan négocié entre Alexis Tsipras et les créanciers à Bruxelles

di Eric Toussaint

A l’initiative du gouvernement d’Alexis Tsipras et du parlement hellène, le peuple grec a rejeté massivement le 5 juillet 2015, par référendum, la poursuite de l’austérité que voulaient imposer les institutions qui auparavant agissaient sous le nom de Troïka. C’est une splendide
victoire de la démocratie.

Pourtant, si il est mis en pratique, l’accord intervenu le lundi 13 juillet au matin, signifiera la poursuite de l’austérité dans le cadre d’un nouvel accord pluriannuel. C’est en totale contradiction avec le résultat du référendum.

Cette proposition inclut l’abandon d’une série très importante d’engagements pris par Syriza lors de la campagne électorale qui lui ont permis d’obtenir une victoire d’une portée historique le 25 janvier 2015. Syriza a engagé sa responsabilité face au peuple grec et il serait tragique qu’elle ne la respecte pas d’autant que le peuple lui a apporté un appui très clair tant le 25 janvier que le 5 juillet 2015.

Les concessions faites aux créanciers par le gouvernement grec portent sur les retraites qui seront diminuées une fois encore (alors que Syriza s’était engagé à rétablir le 13e mois pour les retraites inférieures à 700 euros par mois), l’âge de départ à la retraite qui sera repoussé, les salaires qui resteront comprimés, les relations de travail qui seront encore plus précarisées, l’augmentation des impôts indirects y compris ceux supportés par les bas revenus, la poursuite et l’accélération des privatisations, l’accumulation de nouvelles dettes illégitimes afin de rembourser les précédentes, la poursuite de l’abandon d’éléments importants du droit à l’autodétermination,…

Contrairement à ceux qui affirment qu’en échange de ces concessions néfastes, la Grèce obtiendra trois ans de répit et pourra relancer de manière importante l’activité économique, la réalité montrera qu’avec le maintien de la compression de la demande des ménages et de la dépense publique, il sera impossible de dégager l’excédent fiscal annoncé dans le plan.

La conséquence néfaste est inéluctable : dans quelques mois ou au début de l ‘année prochaine au plus tard, les créanciers attaqueront les autorités grecques pour non respect de leurs engagements en terme d’excédent budgétaire primaire et avanceront de nouvelles exigences. Il n’y aura pas de répit pour le peuple et pour le gouvernement grecs. Les créanciers menaceront de ne pas débourser les sommes prévues si de nouvelles mesures d’austérité ne sont pas adoptées. Les autorités grecques seront prises dans l’engrenage des concessions[2].

La Commission pour la Vérité sur la Dette publique instituée par la présidente du Parlement grec a établi dans son rapport préliminaire rendu public les 17 et 18 juin 2015 que la dette réclamée par les actuels créanciers doit être considérée comme illégitime, illégale et odieuse. La Commission a également démontré que son remboursement est insoutenable. Sur la base d’arguments fondés sur le droit international et le droit interne, le gouvernement grec peut suspendre de manière souveraine le paiement de la dette afin que l’audit des dettes soit conduit à son terme. Une telle suspension de paiement est tout à fait possible. Depuis février 2015, la Grèce a remboursé 7 milliards d’euros aux créanciers sans que ceux-ci versent les 7,2 milliards qui devaient l’être dans le cadre du programme qui a pris fin au 30 juin 2015. D’autres sommes auraient dû être versées à la Grèce et ne l’ont pas été : les intérêts perçus par la BCE sur les titres grecs, le solde prévu pour la recapitalisation des banques, etc. Si la Grèce suspend le paiement de la dette à l’égard des créanciers internationaux, elle économisera près de 12 milliards d’euros qu’elle est supposée leur rembourser d’ici la fin de l’année 2015[3]. En suspendant le paiement de la dette, les autorités grecques amèneraient les créanciers à faire des concessions. Une réduction radicale du montant de la dette pourrait en découler soit par la voie de la négociation, soit par celle de la répudiation.

Il est possible de rester dans la zone euro tout en prenant de manière souveraine une série de mesures d’autodéfense et de relance de l’économie.

Chacun a pu faire le constat qu’il est impossible de convaincre par la simple discussion la Commission européenne, le FMI, la BCE et les gouvernements néolibéraux au pouvoir dans les autres pays européens de prendre des mesures qui respectent les droits des citoyens grecs ainsi que ceux des peuples en général. Le référendum du 5 juillet qu’ils ont combattu ne les a pas convaincus. Au contraire, bafouant les droits démocratiques fondamentaux, ils ont radicaliser leurs exigences. Sans prendre des mesures souveraines fortes d’autodéfense, les autorités et le peuple grecs ne pourront pas mettre fin à la violation des droits humains perpétrés à la demande des créanciers. Toute une série de mesures devraient être prises à l’échelle européenne pour rétablir la justice sociale et une authentique démocratie. Techniquement, il n’est pas compliqué de les prendre mais il faut bien constater que dans le contexte politique et avec les rapports de force qui prévalent dans l’Un. européenne, les pays avec un gouvernement progressiste ne peuvent pas espérer être entendus ni soutenus par la Commission européenne, la BCE, le Mécanisme européen de stabilité. Au contraire, tant ces institutions que le FMI et les gouvernements néolibéraux en place dans les autres pays combattent activement l’expérience en cours en Grèce afin de démontrer à tous les peuples d’Europe qu’il n’y a pas d’alternatives au modèle néolibéral. En revanche, par des mesures fortes, les autorités grecques peuvent leur arracher de véritables concessions ou simplement les obliger à prendre acte des décisions prises. Il est fondamental également de fonder une stratégie alternative en suscitant des mobilisations populaires massives en Grèce et dans les autres pays d’Europe. Les autorités grecques pourraient s’appuyer dessus pour empêcher les tentatives d’isolement que ne manqueront pas d’organiser toutes les forces opposées aux changements en faveur de la justice sociale. En retour, une telle démarche du gouvernement grec renforcerait les mobilisations populaires et la confiance en leurs propres forces des citoyens mobilisés.

A côté de la suspension du paiement de la dette illégitime, illégale, odieuse et insoutenable, voici quelques propositions à soumettre d’urgence au débat démocratique car elles sont de nature à aider la Grèce à se relever.

Les pouvoirs publics grecs constituent de loin l’actionnaire majoritaire des grandes banques grecques (représentant plus de 80% du marché bancaire grec) et devraient donc exercer pleinement le contrôle des banques afin de protéger l’épargne des citoyens et relancer le crédit interne pour soutenir la consommation. D’une part, il conviendrait de tirer les conséquences de la participation majoritaire de l’Etat dans les banques en leur conférant un statut d’entreprise publique. L’Etat devrait organiser une faillite ordonnée de ces banques en veillant à protéger les petits actionnaires et les épargnants. Il s’agit de récupérer le coût de l’assainissement des banques sur le patrimoine global des gros actionnaires privés car ce sont eux qui ont provoqué la crise et ont ensuite abusé du soutien public. Une bad bank serait créée pour isoler les actifs toxiques en vue d’une gestion extinctive. Il faut une fois pour toutes faire payer les responsables de la crise bancaire, assainir en profondeur le secteur financier et le mettre au service de la population et de l’économie réelle.

Les autorités grecques doivent réquisitionner la banque centrale. A sa tête se trouve aujourd’hui Yannis Stournaras (placé à ce poste par le gouvernement d’Antonis Samaras) qui met toute son énergie à empêcher le changement voulu par la population. C’est un véritable cheval de Troie qui sert les intérêts des grandes banques privées et des autorités européennes néolibérales. L
a banque centrale de Grèce doit être mise au service des intérêts de la population grecque.

Les autorités grecques ont également la possibilité de créer une monnaie électronique (libellée en euro) à usage interne au pays. Les pouvoirs publics pourraient augmenter les retraites ainsi que les salaires de la fonction publique, payer les aides humanitaires aux personnes en leur ouvrant un crédit en monnaie électronique qui pourrait être utilisé pour de multiples paiements : facture d’électricité, d’eau, paiement des transports en commun, paiement des impôts, achats d’aliments et de biens de première nécessité dans les commerces, etc. Contrairement à un préjugé infondé, même les commerces privés auraient tout intérêt à accepter volontairement ce moyen de paiement électronique car cela leur permettra à la fois d’écouler leur marchandises et de régler des paiements à l’égard des administrations publiques (paiement des impôts et de différents services publics qu’ils utilisent). La création de cette monnaie électronique complémentaire permettrait de diminuer les besoins du pays en euros. Les transactions dans cette monnaie électronique pourraient être réalisées par les téléphones portables comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui en Equateur.

Le gouvernement pourrait également émettre de titres publics en papier sous formes de IOU’s (I Owe You), équivalents à des billets d’euro: 10 euros, 20 euros,… pour faire face à la pénurie de billets en circulation. Ils présentent un avantage par rapport à la drachme car ils laissent la porte ouverte à la négociation et permettent à la Grèce de rester formellement dans la zone euro.

Le contrôle sur les mouvements de capitaux doit être maintenu de même que doit être mis en place un contrôle des prix à la consommation.

L’organisme chargé des privatisations doit être dissout et doit être remplacé par une structure publique de gestion des biens nationaux (avec arrêt immédiat des privatisations) chargée de protéger le patrimoine public tout en générant des revenus.

De nouvelles mesures doivent être adoptées dans un souci de justice fiscale en vue de renforcer très nettement celles déjà prises, notamment en décidant de taxer très fortement les 10 % les plus riches (et en particulier le 1% le plus riche) tant sur leurs revenus que sur leur patrimoine. De même, il convient d’augmenter fortement l’impôt sur les bénéfices des grandes entreprises privées et de mettre fin à l’exemption fiscale des armateurs. Il faut aussi taxer plus fortement l’Eglise orthodoxe qui n’a versé que quelques millions d’euros d’impôts en 2014.

Une réduction radicale des impôts sur les bas revenus et les petits patrimoines doit être décidée, ce qui bénéficierait à la majorité de la population. Les taxes sur les produits et services de première nécessité doivent baisser radicalement. Une série de services de première nécessité doivent être gratuits (électricité et eau limitées à une certaine consommation, transports publics, etc.). Ces mesures de justice sociale relanceront la consommation.

La lutte contre la fraude fiscale doit être intensifiée avec la mise en place de mesures très dissuasives contre la grande fraude fiscale. Des sommes importantes peuvent être récupérées.

Un vaste plan public de création d’emplois doit être mis en œuvre pour reconstruire des services publics dévastés par des années d’austérité (par exemple, en matière de santé et d’éducation) et pour poser les premiers jalons de la nécessaire transition écologique.

Ce soutien au secteur public doit être accompagné de mesures visant à apporter un soutien actif à la petite initiative privée qui joue un rôle essentiel aujourd’hui en Grèce à travers les micro-entreprises.

Réaliser une politique d’emprunt public interne via l’émission de titres de la dette publique à l’intérieur des frontières nationales. En effet, l’État doit pouvoir emprunter afin d’améliorer les conditions de vie des populations, par exemple en réalisant des travaux d’utilité publique. Certains de ces travaux peuvent être financés par le budget courant grâce à des choix politiques affirmés, mais des emprunts publics peuvent en rendre possibles d’autres de plus grande envergure, par exemple pour passer du « tout automobile » à un développement massif des transports collectifs, développer le recours aux énergies renouvelables respectueuses de l’environnement, créer ou rouvrir des voies ferrées de proximité sur tout le territoire en commençant par le territoire urbain et semi-urbain, ou encore rénover, réhabiliter ou construire des bâtiments publics et des logements sociaux en réduisant leur consommation d’énergie et en leur adjoignant des commodités de qualité. Il s’agit aussi de financer le vaste plan de création d’emplois proposé plus haut.

Il faut définir de toute urgence une politique transparente d’emprunt public. La proposition que nous avançons est la suivante : 1. la destination de l’emprunt public doit garantir une amélioration des conditions de vie, rompant avec la logique de destruction environnementale ; 2. le recours à l’emprunt public doit contribuer à une volonté redistributive afin de réduire les inégalités. C’est pourquoi nous proposons que les institutions financières, les grandes entreprises privées et les ménages riches soient contraints par voie légale d’acheter, pour un montant proportionnel à leur patrimoine et à leurs revenus, des obligations d’État à 0 % d’intérêt et non indexées sur l’inflation, le reste de la population pourra acquérir de manière volontaire des obligations publiques qui garantiront un rendement réel positif (par exemple, 3%) supérieur à l’inflation. Ainsi si l’inflation annuelle s’élève à 2%, le taux d’intérêt effectivement payé par l’Etat pour l’année correspondante sera de 5%. Une telle mesure de discrimination positive (comparable à celles adoptées pour lutter contre l’oppression raciale aux États-Unis, les castes en Inde ou les inégalités hommes-femmes) permettra d’avancer vers davantage de justice fiscale et vers une répartition moins inégalitaire des richesses.
Enfin, les autorités grecques doivent veiller à la poursuite du travail de la commission d’audit et des autres commissions qui travaillent sur les mémorandums et les dommages de guerre.

D’autres mesures complémentaires, discutées et décidées d’urgence démocratiquement, sont bien sûr susceptibles de venir compléter ce premier dispositif d’urgence qui peut être résumé avec les cinq piliers suivants :

la prise de contrôle par l’Etat des banques et d’une partie de la création monétaire,
la lutte contre la fraude fiscale et la mise en place d’une réforme fiscale juste apportant à l’Etat les ressources nécessaires pour la mise en œuvre de sa politique,
la protection du patrimoine public et sa mise au service de l’ensemble de la collectivité,
la réhabilitation et le développement des services publics,
le soutien à une initiative privée de proximité.

Il est également important d’engager la Grèce dans un processus constituant avec participation citoyenne active afin de permettre des changements démocratiques structurels. Pour réaliser ce processus constituant, il faut convoquer, via une consultation au suffrage universel, l’élection d’une assemblée constituante chargée d’élaborer un projet de nouvelle Constitution. Une fois le projet adopté par l’assemblée constituante qui devra fonctionner en recevant les cahiers de doléances et les propositions émanant du peuple, il sera soumis au suffrage universel.

En cas d’exclusion de la zone euro provoquée par les créanciers ou en
cas de sortie volontaire de la zone euro, les mesures indiquées plus haut sont également adaptées, en particulier la socialisation des banques à l’instar de la nationalisation du système bancaire mis en France à la Libération. Ces mesures devraient être combinées avec une importante réforme monétaire redistributive pouvant s’inspirer de la réforme monétaire réalisée après la Seconde Guerre mondiale par le gouvernement belge. Cette réforme vise à opérer une ponction notamment sur les revenus de ceux qui se sont enrichis sur le dos des autres. Le principe est simple : il s’agit, lors d’un changement de monnaie, de ne garantir la parité automatique entre l’ancienne et la nouvelle monnaie (un ancien euro contre un nouveau drachme par exemple) que jusqu’à un certain plafond.

Au-dessus de ce plafond, la somme excédentaire doit être placée sur un compte bloqué, et son origine justifiée et authentifiée. En principe, ce qui excède le plafond fixé est changé à un taux moins favorable (par exemple, deux anciens euros contre un nouveau drachme) ; en cas d’origine délictueuse avérée, la somme peut être saisie. Une telle réforme monétaire permet de répartir une partie de la richesse de manière plus juste socialement. Un autre objectif de la réforme est de diminuer la masse monétaire en circulation de manière à lutter contre des tendances inflationnistes. Pour qu’elle soit efficace, il faut avoir établi un contrôle strict sur les mouvements de capitaux et sur les changes.

Voici un exemple (bien sûr, les barèmes indiqués peuvent être modifiés après étude de la répartition de l’épargne liquide des ménages et adoption de critères rigoureux) :

1€ s’échangerait contre 1 Drachme nouveau (D.n.) jusque 200.000 euros

1€ = 0,7 D.n. entre 200.000 et 500.000 euros

1€ = 0,4 D.n. entre 500.000 et 1 million d’euros

1€ = 0,2 D.n. au dessus de 1 million d’euros

Si un foyer a 200.000 euros en liquide, il obtient en échange 200.000 D.n.

S’il a 400.000 euros, il obtient 200.000 + 140.000 = 340.000 D.n.

S’il a 800.000 euros, il obtient 200.000 + 210.000 + 120.000 = 530.000 D.n.

S’il a 2 millions d’euros, il obtient 200.000 + 210.000 + 200.000 + 200.000 = 810.000 D.n.

Une vraie logique alternative peut être enclenchée. Et la Grèce peut enfin cesser d’être sous la coupe de ses créanciers. Les peuples d’Europe pourraient retrouver l’espoir dans le changement en faveur de la justice.

[1] Eric Toussaint, docteur en sciences politiques des universités de Liège et de Paris VIII, est porte parole du CADTM international. Il est le coordinateur scientifique de la Commission pour la Vérité sur la Dette publique instituée par la présidente du Parlement grec en avril 2015.

[2] L’auteur remercie Stavros Tombazos, Daniel Munevar, Patrick Saurin, Michel Husson et Damien Millet pour leurs conseils dans la rédaction de ce document. L’auteur porte néanmoins l’entière responsabilité du contenu de ce texte.

[3] 6,64 milliards d’euros et 5,25 milliards d’euros doivent être respectivement payés à la BCE et au FMI d’ici le 31 décembre 2015. Source : Wall Street Journal, http://graphics.wsj.com/greece-debt-timeline/ consulté le 12 juillet 2015

http://www.libero-pensiero.net/eric-toussaint-chiama-i-cittadini-europei-alla-mobilitazione-popolare/